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THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
THE COMMON LAW
By ERNEST BRUNCKEN*

Not so very many years ago, the peculiar power American
courts possess of pronouncing a statute void for unconstitutionality was considered, with practical unanimity, one of-the chief
excellencies of our form-of government. -Being deemed, alike by
lawyer and layman, the necessary consequence of the system of
restricted and divided governmental powers, it was held to afford
a security against arbitrary government such as no other country
could boast. Thirty years ago, Americans would as soon have
given up the Constitution itself as this power of the courts.
To-day, things are changed indeed. A large and by no means
silent minority, which may possibly become a majority before we
suspect it, believes that this power of the judiciary, far from being
a "bulwark of our liberty," to use a trite phrase, has become the
instrument by which a special class among our people may defend
special privileges they enjoy in contravention of the principles
and ideals characteristically American since the days of Jefferson
and the Declaration of Independence. Lawyers may think such
a belief untenable and absurd, but the new doctrine is too persistent and gains adherents too rapidly to warrant contemptuous
neglect.
It is proposed in this article to analyze the nature of the power
to hold a statute unconstitutional, and to suggest some means
that may possibly remove the causes of opposition.
THE NATURE

OF THE POWER

In all countries except the United States and a few whose constitutions, like that of the Australian Federation, are closely
modeled after our own, the constitutionality of a law is considered to be a political and not a judicial question. Perhaps recollection of the maxim in the Code of Justinian, according to which
the maker of a law is its natural interpreter,' has something to do
*Member of the Milwaukee Bar. Contributor of "Making the Accused
Testify Against HimseLf" in 5 MARQUETE LAW REVIEW 82.
"'Who would seem to be fitter to solve doubts and make them clear to

all men, than he to whom the sole power of making laws has been
granted? ....
of statutes."

The emperor is rightly deemed both maker and interpreter
Code I, 14, 12.
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.with this unanimity. 2 The more obvious and immediate reason,
however, is that in all these countries, even though nominally
-democracies, the effective supreme power resides in the Government. Theoretically, at least, the people, having exercised 'their
function of electing representatives, renounce all right to limit
the power of their agents. The representatives, acting in the
prescribed forms, have all power the people themselves might
exercise. Parliament is omnipotent, not in England alone, but-in
most other countries. It may change even-a written constitution.
At most, it has to observe certain modes of procedure differing
from those in ordinary legislation. All this really amounts; when
-compared with the American system, to absolute government exercised by Parliament, just as in the Rome of the Caesars abso-lute government was administered by the Emperor. Allowing a
court to tell such an absolute government that one of its acts is
unconstitutional would be equivalent to giving it the judiciary
powers of a supergovernment.
The American system is fundamentally different. With us, the
people really possess and retain the supreme power, and the various governmental departments have no authority except what the
people have granted them. The familiar distinction that state
legislatures have all legislative powers except those expressly
kept from them, while Congress has only such as are expressly
granted to it by the federal constitution, leaves the principle
intact. Neither the one nor the other can change the constitution
under which it functions.
All this is; of course, a mere restatement of elementary law;
but it was necessary to state again, in order to show the contrast
with foreign systems in which both logic and custom -treat constitutionality as a political question. "Who makes the law shall
iriterpret it." Therefore, where an omnipotent parliament is the
law-maker, it is absurd to destroy that omnipotence by giving the
court the right to hold its laws void. Conversely, where the legislature is a mere agent. through which the real law-maker, the
people, make their will known, -the interpretation belongs to the
principal. However, to ascertain whether an agent has acted
'In some of the new constitutions made since the World War, ques'tions
of constitutionality are referred to special judicial tribunals; but there
the matter must be brought by a direct-and special proceeding. It cannot
be made an issue collaterally in an action between private parties' and in
the ordinary courts. Such a method still leaves' the'-question political
rather, than juridical; only, the arguments are addressed to a bench of
judges instead of legislative or executive officers. A court of this kind is
analogous to our administrative boards with quasi-judicial functions.
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within the scope of his authority is clearly a judicial -function.
Consequently, as all judicial power has been delegated by the
people to the courts, the interpretation of the constitution, with
us, belongs to them.
To most lawyers, accustomed from their youth to the traditional American system, such reasoning must appear obvious,
and the opposition to this power of the courts almost perverse;
yet it will hardly do to charge so large a group as those who attack
this power- with being either stupid or acting against their better
knowledge. A closer analysis of the judicial function may throw
light on this puzzle.
As long as the issue of unconstitutionality is based on questions
solvable by the ordinary rules of interpreting written instruments,
the juridical character of the problem is so obvious that objection
is seldom made. Where a constitution provides that the legislature must not pass a special law granting corporate powers, and
the legislature attempts to do so, even the most zealous opponent
of judicial power will probably be satisfied to let the court correct
the legislative error. In such a case the question is whether a
definite formulated rule of the Constitution and a definite, formulated rule contained in an attempted statute are inconsistent.
Nobody in this country denies that where two such definite rules
conflict, the Constitution must prevail, although the statute is the
later enactment.
There is another class of cases, however, where a definite rule
laid down in a statute may conflict, not with a similarly definite
rule in the Constitution, but with some principle enunciated by
that instrument-in general terms only, or perhaps held merely to
be implied from fundamental notions lying behind the Constitution. Such a notion is, for instance, the universal right to enter
into contracts not prohibited by some other principle equally
fundamental.'
In such cases, the logical character of the court's work is essentially different from that of the former class. It is no longer the
comparison of two definite rules, expressed in authoritative language and to be accomplished by well-established methods drawn
from philology and logic. Instead, it is now the court's duty to
discover what the principle invoked actually means according to
the ideas predominating in the minds of the community. Thereupon, it will declare whether the idea underlying the statute is or
'On the distinction between "principles" and "rules" of law, see:
Bruncken, "Interpretation of Written Law," 25 Yale Law Journal, i2o.
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is not consistent with the beliefs or habits prevailing among the
people and but indefinitely expressed in the principles of the
Constitution. In other words, the court -must apply what has
sometimes been called conveniently the sociological method of
interpretation.
N6w it will be found that the persistent popular dissatisfaction
with certain decisions relating to the constitutionality of statutes
is almost altogether confined to cases decided according to this
sociological method. That is, the courts, or the majority of their
judges, differ with their critics regarding the actual state of the
public mind. In most cases, these differences occur in cases relating to the police power.
THE COMrMON LAW BACKGROUND

This condition can not be properly understood except by a
reference to the peculiar nature of the American and English
legal system, which distinguishes it sharply from the modem lawv
of the so-called civil law countries, even where there is a superficial resemblance in the actual rules.
Although written law embodied in constitutions and statutes
has increased enormously within the last hundred years, t is
still true that American law is essentially customary or unwritten
law.4 In daily practice the American lawyer has to deal with
statutory questions many times before he has to solve a single
question regarding the common law; consequently, it is not surprising that the true nature of our legal institutions is not always
present in his consciousness. Yet it is a fact that no statutory
or constitutional provision can be treated as an independent stateient of the law, to be interpreted merely by its text and the rules
of logic. In every case it must be understood with referene to
the common law. It is nothing more than an amendment of the
latter, whether it makes a mere trifling change or entirely reconstructs a whole province of the legal realm.5
This character of American law is curiously illustrated by the
'In the modern Continental system (as well as in the Latin-American
countries) all law is presumed to be found in the codes and other enactments. If it is clainied that a custom modifies the written provision,
such claim must be proven in a manner analogous to.the requirements of
providing a special custom in England. This is commonly difficult, and
often made more so by judicial usage, wus fori, which of course, is itself
a kind of customary law, but one known to and applied by the court,
proprio motif.
'See for a larger treatment of this subject: 'Bruncken, The Common
Law and Statutes, 29 Yale Law Journal, 516, and cases there cited.
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experience of California with its codes, containing an express
provision that "the codes are not amendments of existing law,
What
but an independent sfatement of the law of the state."
could be more definite than this direction? Moreover, there is
another provision, according to which the court may follow the
common law of England as subsidiary law where no pertinent
provision is found in the codes. Accordingly, the common law
has no greater authority in California than the Siete Partidasor
any other portion of Spanish or Mexican law, which also may be
used as subsidiary in proper cases. Such is the theory. In practice, a glance at any published California case shows that the
courts of that state argue precisely as do those of common law
jurisdictions, with constant reference to precedents based on the
common law, which they find in the other states or in England.
They cannot do differently as long as they adhere to the rule of
stare decisis, for that rule means, if it means anything, that no
,vritten law is an original statement but an-amendment of a preexisting legal principle declared in some previous decision of a
court. Thus the code section cited is nullified by the common
consent of a people and a bar to whom common law methods are
as natural as eating and drinking. Probably no California lawyer,
since Mexican dominion was ended, has ever thought of doubting
the doctrine of binding precedent.
If then, our law is still what it has always been, customary law
overlaid by an immense growth of statutory amendments, it becomes essential for an understanding of judicial methods, to
inquire into the manner of declaring the binding custom of the
country. If we follow any common law rule or principle backward along the line of leading cases-to the decision in which it
was first announced, we shall find invariably that the court bases
its judgment on some notion of common sense. He assumes, as
somethiilg beyond dispute, that there is a particular way of acting
in the premises which one may expect from any upright and reasonable human being. The question to decide is whether the
parties have acted in that way or not. If one of them has failed
to do so, judgment goes against him. That way of acting is the
custom of the country, the common law, and it is supposed to be
known to all persons, including judges and attorneys. In fact,
this universal knowledge regarding it is what makes it the law.
After the court has once judicially declared it, there is no further
' California Civil Code, sec. 4; and analogous sections of the four other

codes.
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need of ,falling back on the universal sentiment of the outside
community.. The declared opinion of the court, the precedent,
now becomes the starting point, and logic the method by which
the rule of the first decision, with all its implications and corollaries, is applied to the facts presented by subsequent cases.
From time to time, however, the court is struck with the impression that to follow the strictly logical reasoning would work obvious injustice, inconvenience or absurdity; then he breaks away
from the logical leading strings and resorts once more to the
living fountain of law, the customs of actual life, for a wise judge
is aware that logic is the tool, but by no means the motive power,
of legal development. When and how this break in the logical
chain is to be made must remain a matter of judicial tact; no rule
can be stated regarding it.
Now it is simple enough for the judge to know what is the
customary way of acting in his community as long as the life of
society flows on quietly and steadily without great and sudden
changes. To do so, however, becomes one of the most difficult
things in the world in periods when the moral attitude, the intellectual habits, and the methods of carrying on business in the
community are changing profoundly sometimes within a single
decade. Such is the predicament in which we find ourselves today. For a century or more, the evolution of economic and social
life has proceeded at such a rapid pace that many a man, not
happening to be of rapidly adjustable temperament, has been left
hopelessly behind by "progress" of such feverish tempo.
Here is to be found the true reason vhy so many courts, in
deciding cases involving the police power and other matters
founded on general principles rather than definitely established
rules, are unable to make their opinions conform to what large
portions of the people conceive those principles to be. They have
no established precedent to guide them and must needs resort to
what knowledge they have of the universal custom. But as a
matter of fact, there is no custom, no general expectation that
a person will act in a given manner; there may even be several
customs. One class or group conceives one way of acting in certain circumstances to be the only just, reasonable and expedient
one; another group of people may hold diametrically opposed
views; but the courts must come to some decision. They cannot
suspend their judgment until further knowledge is gained, as
Vould a scientific investigator intending merely to find"the fruth,
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instead of having to put an end to a controversy, as is. the business of a court. Of necessity, in such cases, the court's decision
will seem to be grossly perverse to one group in the commimity
or to the other.
Such is the fate of our courts at the present time whenever
they decide a question relating to the police power of state and
federal governments. Being mostly elderly gentlemen, where
public opinion is rapidly changing the judges will tend to lean
toward the conservative side. When most of the present judges
were in the "rising young lawyer" stage, the almost universal
custom, in effect the common law of this country, was to leave
practically all economic activities to the unrestricted, unsupervised enterprise of -individuals. Even so mild and cautious an
innovation as the doctrine of the so-called Granger cases,- that
there may be some kinds of business peculiarly affected with a
"public interest" and therefore legitimately liable to governmental
regulation, came with quite a severe shock to a majority of
lawyers and laymen of those days. When the majority of the
United States Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting
bakers from working more than a certain number of hours at
night invaded the inalienable right of these workmen to make
their own contracts,8 they merely failed to realize that a -farreaching change in public opinion had taken place within less than
the life-time of the judges themselves. If that decision had been
rendered thirty years earlier, it would undoubtedly have been
approved by substantially unanimous opinion. In fact, no legislature of i86o ivould have passed such a statute.
Is THERE A REMEDY?
The question then arises: Are the decisions often rendered in
cases of this kind, blocking as they do lines of progress highly
approved by a majority in the community, so obnoxious to the
deliberate wishes of the American people as to justify overturning one of our most characteristically American institutions
by depriving the courts of the power to decide questions of unconstitutionality?
One might simply counsel the critics of the courts to have
t
Munn Iv.Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway
v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 115.
'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 Lawyers' ed. 938; 25.Supr. Ct.
Rep. 539. See also: Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 175; Mathews v. People,
202 Ills. 389; Ex rel. Rogers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. ii6. Comp. Pound,

Liberty of Contract, 27 Yale Law Journal, 454.

THE CONSTITUTION, COURTS, AND COMMON LAW

219

patience. The elderly judges, still imbued with notions cast aside
by the new generation, are not immortal. As they retire and
youriger men fill their places, the new opinions will have their
chance and the obnoxious precedents be overruled, or whittled
away into innocuous desuetude by the familiar process of distinguishing. This advice might appeal to the thorough-paced
legal mind. It would seem, however, as if the dissatisfaction had
become too widely spread and had assumed 'too distinctively a
political character to allow of a method so typically lawyer-like.
The process of changing the law by changes on the bench might
be accelerated somewhat, if the Ohio constitutional provision were
universally adopted, according to which a statute cannot be held
unconstitutional as long as two of the judges uphold it. That
would do away with the irritating five-to-four decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. It is really nothing more than
the express enactment of a principle steadily upheld by the courts
in theory, sometimes in the same opinion in which it is violated
in practice, for it is elementary that every presumption is in favor
of the constitutionality of the act of a c.o-ordinate branch of the
government, *and only the most convincing reasons will justify
the court in holding a statute void as unconstitutional.
One
should think that the reasons against validity can hardly be very
clear and indubitable, where four learned justices out of nine do
not see their cogency.
It is not probable, however, that the existing agitation against
continuing to let the courts exercise this power will be quieted by
such mild devices; much more radical measures have already been
proposed, although hardly elaborated with sufficient definiteness.
Theodore Roosevelt's dramatic pronouncement for a "recall of
decisions" need not be taken too seriously. It was probably more
the impulsive outburst of an orator enamored of epigram than
the deliberate counsel of a statesman. Recently, however, a leader
hardly less distinguished than the late president, and at the same
time himself a lawyer, has suggested that an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court should have, in such cases, a merely
suspensive effect. If at its next session the Congress re-enacts
the law, it must be given effect by the court. If Congress fails
to do so, the opinion of the court stands as law.
This proposal of Senator LaFollette was made in the course
of a political speech"" and he has not, to the writer's knowledge,
' See address of Former Justice Clark, Proceed. Amer. Bar. Assoc., 1923.
0 Speech to the American Federation of Labor at Cincinnati, June, 1922.
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formulated the idea as a definite legislative measure. Since then,
and no doubt encouraged by the distinguished senator's authority,
a number of political conventions of varying degrees of progressivism or radicalism have declared for this measure as a
remedy for what some of them have been pleased to call the
usurpation of power by the courts.
An obvious feature of this proposition is that it breaks with
the American distinction between the Constitution and ordinary
legislation, as functions of different nature, entrusted the one to
a body with delegated and restricted powers, the other exercised
by the people themselves in their soverign capacity, acting through
the several states. It may be doubtful whether the adoption of
such a measure would not, in effect, change the entire character
of our government, whether it would not substitute for the limited government as we have known it in the United States, thc
English and Continental system of an omnipotent parliament, for
evidently Congress might enact any law whatever, and by the
simple device of re-enacting it after the Supreme Court had pronounced it void, change. the Constitution to any extent they saw
fit.
Where the United States Supreme Court has pronounced
against the constitutionality of a state statute, it is not clear
whether the state legislature is to have the analogous right of
validating it by re-enactment. If so, additional complications may
arise. It may be that the invalidity was based on conflict with an
act of Congress. If the legislature can validate its statute, can
it not thereby repeal an act of Congress? Or even of the federal
constitution? That comes very close to the ancient doctrine of
nullification.
The proposal, in its present shape, can hardly be expected to
gain the, approval of the American people until they are ready to
abolish much of what is most characteristic in our institutions.
It seems to the writer, however, as if the underlying idea of a
decision merely suspensive at first could be utilized without subjecting the Constitution to any appreciable strain, by the following device: Let the judgment, in those cases involving unconstitutionality for inconsistency with general principles rather
than formulated rules, be- suspended until after the next session
of Congress. Then let Congress, if it chooses, adopt a resolution upholding the validity of the *act, perhaps giving the reasons
for its opinion. Such -a resolution ought to be miost excellent
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evidence for the court in its task of discovering what the belief
and custom 6fthe community, its mores, really is in the premises.
It is safe to say that in most cases the court would accept such
evidence as conclusive. In this way the danger of establishing
precedents based on erroneous conceptions of settled public desire
would be avoided, and on the other hand the basic principles of
the American form of government would remain intact.

